

Festival Games: Inebriated and Sober Altruists

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Abstract

We run a staged field experiment during three concerts in the South of Italy, characterized by the same traditional music and a comparable average level of alcohol consumption by attendees. Individual blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is measured through electronic breathalyzers. The experimental games proposed to concert attendees are contractions (mini-games) of the private-property and the common-property trust game in Cox et al. (2009). We elaborate predictions on behavior of sober (BAC=0.0 g/l) and inebriated (BAC>0.0 g/l) participants based on the revealed altruism theory of Cox et al. (2008). We find that alcohol consumption leads to less pro-social behavior (measured as either trust or reciprocity) independently of the version (private-property or common-property) of the trust game. Furthermore, inebriated participants show strategic altruism in the role of first mover (trust), but not in the role of second mover (reciprocity) in the trust game.

Keywords: Staged Field Experiment, Alcohol, Trust Game, Trust, Reciprocity, Private vs. Common Property, Tourists.

JEL codes: C72, C93, Z10, Z32

1. Introduction

Recent experimental studies in the laboratory have investigated the effect of alcohol consumption on altruism and cooperation (Au and Zhang 2016, Bregu et al. 2017, Corazzini et al. 2015, Hothrow et al. 2007). Results of these studies are mixed. While Corazzini et al. (2015) show a negative relation between alcohol consumption and altruism, Au and Zhang (2016) and Bregu et al. (2017) do not report significant results. With regards to cooperation, Bregu et al. (2017) find that a moderate alcohol consumption smooths the negotiation process by increasing subjects' willingness to collaborate. However, Hothrow et al. (2007), when studying the combined effect of alcohol consumption and group belonging on cooperative behavior, find that alcohol play no effect on cooperative decisions.

Attanasi et al. (2017) depart from extant literature by focusing on a field cultural environment, in which subjects freely decide to consume alcohol. They investigate whether, and to what extent, alcohol consumption facilitates the creation of instantaneous social capital, i.e. the enhancement of trust in other festival attendees due to event attendance (see, Arcodia and Whitford 2006). They find that both measured and perceived alcohol consumption boost instantaneous social capital, thereby leading to alcohol-related endogenous group formation during event attendance.

Despite being a survey study, their work is novel in two regards. With respect to survey studies, which rely on self-reported answers on alcohol consumption, they provide an exact measure of respondents' blood alcohol concentration (through electronic alcoholmeters), thereby avoiding problems of under- or over-report. With respect to lab experiments, they provide a more realistic setting, with a higher variability in blood alcohol concentration.

Our paper builds on the methodology of Attanasi et al. (2017) and extends their work in several directions. First, we run a staged field experiment on the trust game, thereby introducing monetary incentives and strategic interaction among event participants. Second, we study the effect of alcohol consumption over two distinct features of altruism, namely trust and reciprocity, this distinction relying on the two player roles of our experimental game. Third, we run the staged field experiment in three events (one of which is the same as in Attanasi et al. 2017), in order to check for the effects of population size and of tourist vs. non-tourist seasons on the relationship between alcohol and pro-social behavior during the event.

In particular, we run the private-property vs. common-property experimental trust game of Cox et al. (2009), where Cox et al. (2008) "revealed altruism theory" provides predictions for more (first-mover's) trust and more (second-mover's) reciprocity in the private-property than in the common-property game. Due to blood alcohol concentration measurement, we end up having a 2x2 staged field design, with sober (blood alcohol concentration equal to 0) vs. inebriated (blood alcohol concentration greater than 0) participants being the other treatment variable.

We test two main behavioral hypotheses. First, we want to see whether sober participants trust more and reciprocate more with respect to inebriated participants within a specific version of the trust game (private-property or common-property). Second, we aim at checking whether alcohol consumption inhibits strategic altruism leading to more trust and more reciprocity in the private-property than in the common-property game.

We find that (Results 1 and 3 below) alcohol consumption leads to less pro-social behavior (measured as either trust or reciprocity) independently of varying the strategic features of the game (private property vs. common property). Furthermore, inebriated participants show strategic altruism in the role of first mover (Result 2 below: higher trust in the private-property than in the common-property game), but not in the role of second mover (Result 4 below: same level of reciprocity in the private-property and in the common-property game).

2. Methods

Participants were concert attendants in three southern Italian villages, located within a 20-km radius in the Province of Lecce, and similar in terms of economic and social indicators. A *staged field experiment* was run during three cultural events (3 sessions), one in each village, taking place, respectively, on August 24, August 30, and October 5, 2013.¹

We have chosen three different concerts in three different locations, but with similar structure and “cultural environment”. Indeed, all of the three concerts were free entry, started at the same time (8 pm), lasted at least 4 hours and were held in a central square of the village. More importantly, the three villages share a cradle of long-lasting and deep-rooted traditions, called “Tarantism”, a legend that nowadays identifies these and other few villages within the Province of Lecce as an independent cultural area (Grecìa Salentina). Each of the three concerts was part of a folk music festival promoting the traditional musical repertoire characteristic of the Tarantism, which represents the cultural heritage of this area.²

More precisely, the Tarantism is a form of hysteric behavior, popularly believed to result from the bite of the wolf spider *Lycosa tarantula*.³ The evocative and theatrical representation of the post-bite therapeutic dance has recently caught on the “pizzica” and related music genres which, combined together with folk beats coming from different cultural backgrounds, are the core element of the concerts we analyze in this paper.⁴ Such concerts usually attract young attendants, enjoying an exciting atmosphere, with frenetic dancing and alcohol consumption.⁵ In the last 10 years, concerts taking place in the month of August also had a significant tourist impact on the area where the concerts were held (Province of Lecce), with several attendants not residing in the Province of Lecce (from now on, “tourists”) being on summer vacation in the area also or just for these concerts. In particular, as Attanasi et al. (2013) show, the highest percentage of tourists among attendants during these concerts is usually detected in the first (and most famous) concert among those we have analyzed, i.e. the final concert of “La Notte della Taranta” Festival, held each year during the last Saturday of August, where there are more tourists than locals among concert attendants. Then, the percentage of tourists attending such cultural events in the Province of Lecce slightly decreases until the end of August, and is negligible since the end of September.⁶

The experimental procedure consisted of two consecutive phases: initial sampling (phase 1) and the experiment itself (phase 2). Both phases were programmed and implemented using the EconPlay software (www.econplay.fr) of the LEES (Laboratory of Experimental Economics of Strasbourg).

¹ The three villages are *Melpignano* (2000 inhabitants), *Carpignano* (4000 inhabitants) and *Cutrofiano* (9000 inhabitants). They are located at the end of southeast Italy, at the very bottom of the Apulia region, the Italian heel (see the map at http://www.punto-salento.it/immagini/cartina_lecce.gif).

² The name of the three festivals, in chronological order, are “*Il Festival de La Notte della Taranta*” (16th edition, August 6–24, 2013, final concert held in *Melpignano* on August 24; Festival website [here](#)), “*La Festa Te lu Mieru*” (38th edition, *Carpignano*, August 30 – September 1 2013; Festival website [here](#)), “*Li Ucci Festival*” (3rd edition, October 2–5 2013, *Cutrofiano*; Festival website [here](#)).

³ Popular belief has it that during the summer harvest, when spiders are about, the bite of the tarantula drove its victims, mainly women, to a state of unconsciousness to come out of which the healing ritual found the music as main cure. The bite-victims were induced to engage in a frenzied dancing because of a fast-paced therapeutic music, believing that the sweat produced by dancing frantically would release the venom from the body (see, e.g., Attanasi 2007).

⁴ These concerts are a true musical melting pot which, successfully started at the end of the 90s with the fusion of sounds coming from the Byzantine, the Balkan or the Turkish culture, keep being attractive nowadays thanks to the original mixture of traditional music with contemporary tunes such as jazz, rock, classical and world music.

⁵ See Attanasi et al. (2017) for the connection between traditional music, frenetic dancing, and alcohol consumption during these concerts.

⁶ As the official statistics of the Tourism Observatory of the Province of Lecce reports (see, e.g., http://www.le.camcom.gov.it/leceosservatorioturismo/pages/dom_movxmese.htm), the tourist attraction of the area is mainly seasonal, with about 88% of tourists over the year coming to the area in June–September, with 41% coming in the month of August. The month of October only accounts for 2% of the tourists over the 12 months.

Phase 1: Initial sampling

Immediately after the beginning of the concert (from 8 pm till 10 pm), we elicited the attendants' idiosyncratic features by individual guided interviews through tablets.⁷ Around 20 interviewers (graduate students) independently selected respondents in different points of the square where the concert was held.⁸

We analyzed data in real time inside our mobile laboratory, located in the same square of the concert. The representativeness of our sample with respect to the population of attendants in each concert has been controlled for through the Marbach test (Marbach, 2000), according to which margin of errors lower than 0.05 are normally seen as acceptable in the literature.

The three cohorts of concert attendants showed the same main idiosyncratic features (see Table 1): age (around half of attendants below 25, and 3/4 below 30), education (half with a high-school diploma, another 1/3 with a university degree), gender (6/10 males), at least 3/10 of attendants being (mainly undergraduate) students, a blood alcohol concentration (BAC)–measured through electronic breathalyzers–equal to around 0.4 g/l on average (the accepted limit for car drivers in Italy being 0.5 g/l).

Furthermore, coherently with our expectations about tourist trend in the area where the concerts were held, Table 1 shows: a higher percentage of tourists than locals in concert 1, by far the main summer cultural event in the area; a lower percentage of tourists than locals in concert 2 (significantly different from concert 1 at the 1% level); a negligible percentage of tourists in the last concert. Indeed, the difference in the percentage of tourists across the three concerts is a treatment variable in the experimental design of phase 2. More precisely, our control treatment is a concert with no tourists among attendants. This is why we waited for the end of the summer season to run the control (concert 3), and we run our main treatment (concert 1) during the closing event of the Festival “La Notte della Taranta”. This event (called “Concertone”) is the one with the highest number of attendants in the area each year, and the one with the highest percentage of tourists among attendants across concerts of the same type and repertoire.

Table 1 – Population, sample and its representativeness, idiosyncratic features

Concert	Date	Population of attendants	Sample size (margin of error)	Age (<25, 25-30, >30)	Education (<HS, HS, >HS)	Males	Students	Tourists	Alcohol (BAC)
1	Aug. 24, 2013	100,000	407 (0.0495)	(55%, 21%, 24%)	(15%, 56%, 29%)	60%	42%	70%	0.37 g/l
2	Aug. 30, 2013	15,000	405 (0.0491)	(44%, 29%, 27%)	(11%, 52%, 37%)	67%	30%	41%	0.42 g/l
3	Oct. 5, 2013	11,000	394 (0.0494)	(41%, 31%, 28%)	(16%, 49%, 35%)	58%	33%	3%	0.39 g/l

Note: *Margin of error* has been calculated according to the Marbach test (Marbach, 2000). It associates the pair of variables N (size of the target population) and n (sample size) with a parameter x that specifies the tolerated margin of error occurring when the sample of size n is taken as representative of the whole population N : $x = \sqrt{N / (N - 1)n - 1 / (N - 1)}$. For *Education*, HS stands for “High School Diploma”, hence <HS (>HS) indicates the estimated percentage of attendants holding a diploma lower (higher) than the high school one. *Alcohol (BAC)* indicates the average level of blood alcohol concentration, measured through an electronic breathalyzer.

Phase 2: Experimental Recruiting

Immediately after the end of population sampling (i.e., from 10 pm onward), we selected subjects as experimental participants. We checked that none of them was part of the sample of attendants

⁷ Our questionnaire is similar to the one used by Attanasi et al. (2013) to elicit the economic and social impact of previous editions of the same cultural events.

⁸ The number of participants in each concert has been estimated by crosschecking the data provided by the Traffic Officer Commands of each municipality with the data we personally collected under the guidance of a surveyor usually residing in the municipality where the concert took place.

interviewed in phase 1. At the end of the experiment, participants filled in the same questionnaire previously filled in by subjects interviewed in phase 1 (data are reported in Table 2).

Table 2 – Experimental participants’ idiosyncratic features

Concert	Date	Population of attendants	Experimental Participants	Age (<25, 25-30, >30)	Education (<HS, HS, >HS)	Males	Students	Tourists	Alcohol (BAC)
1	Aug. 24, 2013	100,000	120	(72%, 13%, 15%)	(17%, 61%, 22%)	53%	46%	66%	0.35 g/l
2	Aug. 30, 2013	15,000	120	(38%, 31%, 31%)	(5%, 53%, 42%)	66%	24%	34%	0.45 g/l
3	Oct. 5, 2013	11,000	60	(28%, 44%, 28%)	(13%, 49%, 38%)	57%	27%	0%	0.40 g/l

Note: For *Education*, HS stands for “High School Diploma”, hence <HS (>HS) indicates the estimated percentage of attendants holding a diploma lower (higher) than the high school one. *Alcohol (BAC)* indicates the average level of blood alcohol concentration, measured through an electronic breathalyzer.

This was for us to check that the demographics of experimental participants were not different from those of the population of concert attendants. Indeed, comparing Table 2 to Table 1 by concert, it is easy to check that the distribution of variables Age and Education and the percentage of males, students and tourists in the experimental subject pool (Table 2) are all not significantly different than in the population of concert attendants (Table 1). Therefore, we can state that our experimental participants are representative of the population of attendants in each concert where the staged field experiment was run.

In particular, we controlled for the number of “tourists” in our pool of experimental participants. More precisely, in concerts 1 and 2, we let subjects participate in the experiment independently from being a local or a tourist. In concert 1, we ended up having 41 locals and 79 tourists participating in the experiment. In concert 2, we stopped looking around for participants after 79 locals and 41 tourists already participated in the game. In concert 3 we found no tourists when looking for experimental participants, coherently with the fact that (as reported in Table 1) tourist represented only 3% of the sample. Considering all concerts together, we ended up having 120 tourists and 180 locals voluntarily participating in our experiment.

In all concerts, subjects accepting to participate in the experiment were previously told they would play with another concert participant, connected through another tablet in another point of the square at around the same time they would play the trust game described in the next section.

During concert 3 (control), our trust game was played among locals only, and this was made public information within the pair. Conversely, in concert 1 and 2, subjects were not informed about whether the opponent was a local or a tourist. Before playing the experimental game, we asked them to guess the percentage of locals participating in the experimental game during that concert, to check that none of the participants was sure to be paired with a local or with a tourist. Due to the huge number of people drinking alcohol during these concerts (average measured BAC being around 0.4 g/l in each concert), we also asked experimental participants to guess the percentage of subjects participating in the experimental game with BAC smaller than or equal to 0.5 g/l.⁹

Each session was conducted through 8 tablets connected to a mobile laboratory located in the center of the concert. Each tablet was assigned to an interviewer who looked for a participant among the concert attendants, their size ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 people, depending on the concert. The eight interviewers—always the same in each concert—were located at different points of the concert area, far away from each other, so as to ensure subject anonymity during experiment participation.

⁹ For the Italian Law, 0.5 g/l is the accepted limit of BAC for all car drivers but those ageing less than 21 years of age or having obtained the driving license since less than 3 years (car drivers in Italy must be at least 18 years of age). For these categories, there is zero tolerance (BAC equal to 0.0 g/l).

The selected participant made his/her choice in the game through the tablet, without the interviewer looking at his/her choice.¹⁰ His/her co-player participated in the experiment through another tablet and interviewer. The tablets were programmed so that the next randomly selected subject would be matched with the previous one, so for these two subjects to play the game almost simultaneously.

At the end of the experimental game, the interviewer gave the subject a tablet ID and accompanied him/her to our mobile laboratory location. The experimental software produced an Excel file containing the subjects' choices, which were projected on a large screen, at the entry of the mobile laboratory. To ensure anonymity, the subject learned his/her payoff by looking for his/her tablet ID in the large screen. Then, he/she moved to another room, where one of the experimental assistants measured his/her BAC through an electronic breathalyzer. Finally, the subject filled in a final questionnaire and was paid his/her earnings in cash and in private.

Average earnings were €18.61, including a €3 show-up fee. The whole procedure—from the moment the subject accepted to participate in the experiment till the moment he/she left the mobile laboratory with his/her earnings—lasted 25 minutes on average.

3. The Experimental Game: Main Behavioral Predictions

The two versions of the trust game that subjects played in our staged field experiment are shown in Figure 1. They are contractions (mini-games) of the private-property game and the common-property game in Cox et al. (2009).

During concerts 1 and 2, we controlled for the number of locals and tourists in each of the four game-role combinations: first mover in the private-property game, second mover in the private-property game, first mover in the common-property game, second mover in the common-property game.

We derive predictions on behavior across games (for sober subjects) based on Cox et al. (2008) revealed altruism theory.

The second mover faces two possible opportunity sets in our games, $E = \{(0,40), (15,25), (20,20)\}$ and the singleton set, $S = \{(10,10)\}$. With respect to the second mover, set E is more generous than set S as the maximum payoff feasible for the second mover increases by 30 euros whereas for the first mover by only 10 euros. In the private-property game, the opportunity set E is made available by the first mover choosing to pass all the endowment to the second mover, an efficient but risky choice that upsets the status quo. In the common-property game the second mover faces E only if the first mover maintains the status quo by refraining from taking 10. Axiom S therefore requires the second mover's choice from E be (weakly) more generous in the private-property game than in the common-property game.

Any deviation from the initial private endowment in the private-property game is perceived as a generous act. Any deviation from the common-pool endowment in the common-property game is perceived as an ungenerous act.

Anticipating that the second mover will be (weakly) more generous in the private-property than in the common-property game, the first mover will trust more in the former than in the latter version of the trust game. This leads to:

Behavioral Hypothesis 1. For sober subjects, we expect to observe more trust (as first mover) and more reciprocity (as second mover) in the private-property than in the common-property game.

The other two behavioral hypotheses are based on previous experimental findings on, respectively, the negative effect and no significant effect of alcohol consumption on pro-social behavior (see the

¹⁰ More precisely: After reading the instructions on the tablet together with the subject, the interviewer gave the tablet to the subject and waited for him/her to choose at a reasonable distance from the subject. After the subject made his/her choice, this disappeared from the tablet's screen, and instructions on the tablet screen invited the subject to give the tablet back to the interviewer.

literature review in Section 1 of the paper). By classifying as “inebriated” those subjects with a BAC higher than 0.0 g/l, we can state the following:

Behavioral Hypothesis 2. Within each version of the trust game, we expect to observe less trust (as first mover) and less reciprocity (as second mover) for inebriated than for sober subjects.

Behavioral Hypothesis 3. For inebriated subjects, we expect to observe no significant difference in terms of trust (as first mover) and of reciprocity (as second mover) between the private-property and common-property game.




Figure 1.a: **Private** Property Trust Game




Figure 1.b: **Common** Property Trust Game

Figure 1. The Experimental Games

4. Results

4.1 Trust

Figure 2 shows the percentage of first movers choosing “Send 10 euros” in the private-property game and “Take 0 euros” in the common-property game, disentangled by sober vs. inebriated participants (see Figure 1). We classify as “inebriated” a subject with a BAC greater than 0.0 g/l.

Table 3 shows the determinants of trusting behavior in the role of first mover, disentangled by sober and inebriated participants, and controlling or not for individual characteristics (gender, age, job, beliefs about own and other participants’ BAC, etc.).

In Table 3, we use the as regressors the following dummies: participation in the common property game, the experimenter holding the tablet being female, participant being a tourist, and being southern Italian. Taking concert 2 as omitted category, we also include two dummies for the other two concerts (concert 1, which was much bigger than concert 2 in terms of population of concert attendants, and concert 3, which was held in a non-tourist period with respect to concert 2). Finally, we include the guess of the percentage of locals participating in the experiment, and the interaction between this guess and being a tourist.




Figure 2. Frequency of trusting actions in the private-property and in the common-property game, disentangled by sober vs. inebriated participants.

	Sober		Inebriated	
Common Property Game	-1.087***	-1.292***	-1.247***	-1.991***
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Experimenter Female	0.177	0.769**	-0.062	0.283
	-0.652	-0.044	-0.835	-0.663
Concert 1 (big and summer)	-0.022	0.540	0.230	1.472***
	-0.954	-0.226	-0.433	0.000
Concert 3 (small and autumn)	-0.887	-0.654	0.041	0.005
	-0.136	-0.339	-0.892	-0.994
Guess Opponent Local	0.453	0.588	1.323***	3.130***
	-0.556	-0.519	0.000	0.000
Tourist	-0.159	-0.963	0.519	3.225***
	-0.898	-0.300	-0.278	0.000
Tourist x Guess Local	-0.079	0.178	-1.064	-4.023***
	-0.933	-0.813	-0.164	-0.001
Southern Italian	-1.121**	-1.513***	-1.198	-2.067**
	-0.038	-0.002	-0.203	-0.039
Control for individual characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 3. Determinants of Trusting Behavior as First Mover

From Figure 2 and Table 3, we derive the following results:

Result 1. Sober participants trust significantly more than inebriated participants in the private-property than in the common-property game. The difference is not significant in the private-property game.

Result 2. Revealed altruism theory works well for both sober and inebriated participants in the role of first mover.

4.2 Reciprocity

Figure 3 shows respectively the percentage of second movers choosing “Return 15 euros” and “Return 20 euros” in the private-property game and “Take 25 euros” and “Take 20 euros” in the common-property game (see Figure 1).




Figure 3. Frequency of reciprocal actions in the private-property and in the common-property game, disentangled by sober vs. inebriated participants.

Table 4 shows the determinants of reciprocal behavior in the role of second mover, disentangled by sober and inebriated participants, and controlling or not for individual characteristics. Regressors are the same as in Table 3.

	Sober		Inebriated	
Common Property Game	-0.538*	-0.524**	0.056	-0.138
Experimenter Female	-0.094	-0.025	-0.886	-0.754
Concert 1 (big and summer)	0.778**	0.864**	0.086	1.819**
Concert 3 (small and autumn)	-0.027	-0.028	-0.813	-0.013
Guess Opponent Local	1.006**	0.912	0.138	0.383
Tourist	-0.033	-0.151	-0.758	-0.330
Tourist x Guess Local	-0.689	-0.557	0.430	0.080
Southern Italian	-0.203	-0.457	-0.481	-0.906
Control for individual characteristics	1.089*	1.239**	0.035	0.762
	-0.071	-0.034	-0.958	-0.223
	1.020	1.329**	0.000	0.288
	-0.125	-0.030	-1.000	-0.787
	-2.267**	-2.975***	0.380	-0.615
	-0.018	-0.003	-0.647	-0.417
	-1.588***	-1.931**	-0.443	-0.655
	-0.007	-0.028	-0.487	-0.331
Control for individual characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 4. Determinants of Reciprocal Behavior as Second Mover

From Figure 3 and Table 4, we derive the following results:

Result 3. Sober participants reciprocate significantly more than inebriated participants in the private-property than in the common-property game. The difference is not significant in the common-property game.

Result 4. Revealed altruism theory works well only for sober participants in the role of second mover. For inebriated participants, we find no significant difference in terms of reciprocity across private-property and common-property game.

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